July 14, 2004

Everything You Wanted To Know About The Office Of Special Plans

I posted this at my other gig last weekend, and thought it would be of interest here as well.

As the argument over Iraq continues to develop, it's clear to me that there’s still confusion about the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans (the OSP), especially since some are claiming the OSP is now a “never existed” organization within the Pentagon (people can’t find any evidence of it, etc.).

That may or may not be, but there’s plenty of information of the OSP in the public domain, so here’s a primer on the topic:

  • The OSP was formed in September, 2002, when Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz renamed the Northern Gulf Affairs Office on the Pentagon's fourth floor (in the seventh corridor of D Ring) the “Office of Special Plans” (OSP) and increased its four-person staff to sixteen. (Center for Cooperative Research timeline … and interesting collection in its own right). At its height, the staff was 18, although it made use of a large number of advisors and consultants (Right Web).
  • In June, 2003 the Pentagon announced that the Office of Special Plans will revert to its previous name, the “Northern Gulf Affairs Office,” explaining that this name more accurately reflects the activities and mission of that office (Center for Cooperative Research). See the Tom Paine press release on the name change here.
  • This July 17, 2003 Guardian article profiles the OSP, calling it “the shadow rightwing intelligence network set up in Washington to second-guess the CIA and deliver a justification for toppling Saddam Hussein by force.”
  • This Salon article (posted at Common Dreams) was authored by Karen Kwiatkowski, a Pentagon staffer on the Near East South Asia directorate desk (which shared space with OSP) offers a “near insider’s” view of the Office. She’s definitely pushing a perspective, but it’s one of the few insider accounts available. A sample:
Throughout the summer, the NESA spaces in one long office on the fourth floor, between the 7th and 8th corridors of D Ring, became more and more crowded. With war talk and planning about Iraq, all kinds of new people were brought in. A politically savvy civilian-clothes-wearing lieutenant colonel named Bill Bruner served as the Iraq desk officer, and he had apparently joined NESA about the time Bill Luti did. I discovered that Bruner, like Luti, had served as a military aide to Speaker Gingrich. Gingrich himself was now conveniently an active member of Bush's Defense Policy Board, which had space immediately below ours on the third floor.

I asked why Bruner wore civilian attire, and was told by others, “He's Chalabi's handler.” Chalabi, of course, was Ahmad Chalabi, the president of the Iraqi National Congress, who was the favored exile of the neoconservatives and the source of much of their “intelligence.” Bruner himself said he had to attend a lot of meetings downtown in hotels and that explained his suits. Soon, in July, he was joined by another Air Force pilot, a colonel with no discernible political connections, Kevin Jones. I thought of it as a military-civilian partnership, although both were commissioned officers.

Among the other people arriving over the summer of 2002 was Michael Makovsky, a recent MIT graduate who had written his dissertation on Winston Churchill and was going to work on “Iraqi oil issues.” He was David Makovsky's younger brother. David was at the time a senior fellow at the Washington Institute and had formerly been an editor of the Jerusalem Post, a pro-Likud newspaper. Mike was quiet and seemed a bit uncomfortable sharing space with us. He soon disappeared into some other part of the operation and I rarely saw him after that.

In late summer, new space was found upstairs on the fifth floor, and the “expanded Iraq desk,” now dubbed the “Office of Special Plans,” began moving there. And OSP kept expanding.

Notably, Michael Rubin takes Kwiatkowski to task at NRO here. In it he notes:

Kwiatkowski did serve in the Pentagon prior to the war, as did I, as did approximately 23,000 others. But, Kwiatkowski was not involved in Iraq policy. Her reminiscences fall more into the realm of fiction than fact. I worked in the Office of Special Plans (OSP), charged with some aspects of the Iraq portfolio. My job was that of any desk officer: Writing talking points for my superiors, analyzing reports, burying myself in details, and drafting replies to frequent letters from Congressmen John Dingell and Dennis Kucinich. I was a participant or a fly-on-the-wall at many postwar planning meetings and accompanying video teleconferences. One person I never met was Kwiatkowski. This should not be a surprising. Kwiatkowski was an Africa specialist who was the point woman for issues relating to Morocco. Just as I never attended meetings relating to Western Sahara, Kwiatkowski was not involved in Iraq policy sessions.

Rather than an inside scoop, Kwiatkowski provided an ideological screed. By her own admission, she started writing Internet columns while still a Pentagon desk officer. But, she did not know many of the people about whom she wrote. The Office of Special Plans consisted of a small number of active duty military officers, reservists, and civilians; both Democrats and Republicans. Kwiatkowski got ranks and services wrong. In rank-conscience corridors of the Pentagon and among military officers, such things do not happen.

Upon her retirement, Kwiatkowski took her story to Jeff Steinberg, editor of the Executive Intelligence Review, the journal of Lyndon LaRouche's movement. Pat Lang, former chief Middle East analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency, circulated Kwiatkowski's deposition to Steinberg in a September 16, 2003, e-mail in which he carbon-copied, rather than blind carbon-copied his distribution list. Among the recipients were prominent journalists and producers, scions of the alternative press, and a smattering of current and former intelligence analysts who often serve as sources in news analyses and articles.

  • In December of 2003, Dennis Kucinich sent a letter to Donald Rumsfeld to “demand answers on his role in promoting misinformation in the lead-up to the war against Iraq.” In the letter, Kucinich writes of the OSP. Read it here.
First of all, the Office of Special Plans that you referred to has nothing really whatsoever to do with intelligence it is one of the regional offices in the policy organization. We have regional offices for Latin America and Africa and Asia. We had - it is the Office of Northern Gulf Affairs. It was created in the fall of 2002 when we had to beef up our staff to handle all of the extra Iraq related work. We needed to increase it by something like 18 people. So we created a new office, and since there was an enormous amount of attention on the Pentagon, on what we were doing and are we planning for war and the creation of a new office that would have been called the Iraq office would have probably in and of itself created headlines. We chose the kind of name that the government gives to offices throughout the government that’s kind of nondescript - you know, “special plans,” long-range plans” - that kind of thing and it's been grist for the conspiracy mongers ever since. But you referred to some intelligence unit, as many press reports did, confuse it with the special plans office. The so-called intelligence unit that was much discussed - it was two people, it was two people who did a project for about - it as not a unit, it was not an office. It was two people. And they did a project for about three months, and then another two people did a follow-on project for about 6 or 7 months.

It's rather amazing that there have been numerous stories that said this was the Pentagon's effort to replace the CIA and I can assure you that we do not hold the CIA in such low regard that we think we could replace them with two people. And in fact we think we - what those people did in that so-called intelligence unit that has been written about, was simply help me read and absorb the intelligence produced by the intelligence community, the CIA and other members of the intelligence community. So all I can say is there is, as I said, so much misinformation on this subject that I would urge everybody to treat with great skepticism what you read on that subject.

  • Here you may read a May 3, 2004 speech (PDF file) by U.S. Senator Jon Kyl to the Center for Strategic and International Studies titled “DOD’s Role in Pre-War Iraq Intelligence: Setting the Record Straight.” In it Kyl discusses the OSP, and offers a view from the right and dismissing much of the thinking in the press as “urban myth.” In part, he notes:
Now to the Office of Special Plans (OSP), which was formed after the PCTEG disbanded. Simply, the office was one of many regional offices in the DOD policy organization. It was designed to develop defense policy options for senior decision makers, coordinate those options within the Defense Department and across the various federal agencies, monitor the implementation of defense policy, and recommend course corrections to defense policy. That’s it. That is what the Policy organization at the Department of Defense is supposed to do. And that is what the Policy organization did under Presidents Clinton, and Bush, and Reagan, and Carter. The Policy organization develops policy options for policymakers based on intelligence assessments, news reports, and facts on the ground.
  • In February, 2004 NPR reported that Senate investigators were looking into the OSP … you may listen to the report here.
  • Disinfopedia has their (not necessarily neutral) profile here.
  • Salon has a feature critical of the OSP, titled “Rumsfeld’s Personal Spy Ring,” here. (The lead: “The defense secretary couldn't count on the CIA or the State Department to provide a pretext for war in Iraq. So he created a new agency that would tell him what he wanted to hear.”)
In addition to the CIA, which is an independent agency, there are four major intelligence organizations inside the Department of Defense. All of these entitles are funded in this bill. The press stories referred to above argue that a group of civilian employees in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), some of whom are political appointees, have long been dissatisfied with the information produced by the established intelligence agencies both inside and outside of the Department. This was particularly true with respect to the situation in Iraq and the reports that these agencies produced regarding Saddam Hussein, his regime, and the general political and military situation in that country.

As a result a special operation was established within the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Office of Special Plans. This cadre of handpicked officials was charged with collecting, vetting, and disseminating intelligence information outside of the normal intelligence apparatus. In fact, it appears that information collected by this office was, in some instances, not shared with established intelligence agencies and, further, passed on to the National Security Council and the President not having been vetted with anyone other that certain OSD political appointees. Perhaps most troubling of all, the articles claim that the purpose of this operation was not only to develop intelligence supporting the cadre’s pre-held views about Iraq, but to intimidate analysts in the established intelligence organizations to produce information that supported policy decisions which they had already decided to propose.

This is opinion, and he notes it as such, but it’s of interest because it’s one of the few references to OSP in official Congressional publications.

Finally, you may see the entire USD Policy org chart here. No box for the Northern Gulf Affairs Office, although Luti is listed as lead of the NESA desk.

Now, here’s why you have to love the internet: hyperlinks. Visit the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy website, and it turns out the NESA desk has a website. Follow that link, and you can see they’ve posted this policy document: Pre-war Planning for Post-war Iraq It’s unclassified, and it begins:

Planning in the U.S. Government for post-war Iraq was an interagency process involving officials from the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Treasury, Energy, and Commerce; the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Central Intelligence Agency, as well as from the staffs of the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget.

DoD mid and senior-level planners and officials engaged in multiple planning initiatives for post-war contingencies. DoD staff in the theater and in Washington evaluated a wide-range of possible outcomes, led efforts to merge and synchronize planning from various government agencies, and shaped planning for the major combat phase of the operation to allow for the best possible post-war conditions.

Key to DoD planning for this operation was the assumption that liberating Iraq from 35 years of tyrannical rule and severe social and economic underdevelopment would be a challenging prospect.

The policy document has a subsection titled “DIRECTORATE OF SPECIAL PLANS,” which reads, in full:

The Office of Near East and South Asia (NESA) Affairs was one of four regional offices (working under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs) whose daily mission was formulating international security and political-military policy. (The other three regional offices being Africa, Asia and Pacific, and Western Hemisphere)


In September 2002, due to increased workload related to the Global War on Terrorism and the possibility of an Iraq contingency, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the expansion of the Northern Gulf Directorate within NESA.

This office was responsible for exploring policy concerns in planning issues ranging from deployment, coalition building, potential war crimes investigations, Iraqi opposition and training issues, oil issues, postwar Iraqi media and many others. Their office was increased from 4 people to approximately 16 to handle the increased workload.

In October 2002, the Directorate of Special Plans was formally established as an expansion of the NESA’s Northern Gulf Directorate to concentrate on policy issues with respect to Iran, Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism.


It was titled the “Directorate of Special Plans” because, at that time, the creation of an “Iraq Planning” group (or similarly named group) in the Pentagon conducting specialized planning for a potential Iraq contingency could have undercut ongoing diplomatic efforts in the UN and elsewhere.

The Directorate of Special Plans was a policy planning group, nothing more. As such, it was a consumer, rather than producer of intelligence products. [Ed. Note: This specific line appears elsewhere … I believe in one of Feith’s speeches … I’ll try to find the verbiage.]


It developed defense policy options for senior decision makers, coordinated those options within DoD and across the interagency, monitored the implementation of defense policy and recommended course corrections to defense policy.

It did not conduct intelligence collection, create intelligence products, conduct operational war planning, or implement policy.

In 2003, when planning for Iraq was no longer a sensitive issue, the office’s name reverted to Near East, South Asia/Northern Gulf (NESA/NG) to reflect its regional focus.

Read the entire policy document here.

Posted by Avocare at July 14, 2004 10:18 AM | TrackBack
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